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Abstract: This paper discusses recent neuroeconomic evidence related to other-regarding 
behaviors and the decision to trust in other people’s other-regarding behavior. This evidence 
supports the view that people derive nonpecuniary utility (i) from mutual cooperation in social 
dilemma (SD) games and (ii) from punishing unfair behavior. Thus, mutual cooperation and 
the punishment of free riders in SD games is not irrational, but better understood as rational 
behavior of people with corresponding social preferences. We also report the results of a 
recent study that examines the impact of the neuropeptide Oxytocin (OT) on trusting and 
trustworthy behavior in a sequential SD. Animal studies have identified Oxytocin as a 
hormone that induces prosocial approach behavior, suggesting that it may also affect prosocial 
behavior in humans. Indeed, the study shows that subjects given Oxytocin exhibit much more 
trusting behavior, suggesting that OT has a direct impact on certain aspects of subjects’ social 
preferences. Interestingly, however, although Oxytocin affects trusting behavior, it has no 
effect on subjects’ trustworthiness.  
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Neuroeconomics merges methods from neuroscience and economics to better understand how 
the human brain generates decisions in economic and social contexts. Neuroeconomics is part 
of the general quest for microfoundations – in this case, the microfoundation of individual 
decision-making in social contexts. The economic model of individual decision-making is 
based on three concepts – the action set, preferences, and beliefs. Economists assume that an 
individual will choose his preferred action for a given set of available actions and a given 
belief about the states of the world and the other players' actions. Neuroeconomics provides a 
microfoundation for individual beliefs, preferences, and behavior; it does so by examining the 
brain processes associated with the formation of beliefs, the perception of the action set, and 
the actual choice. Moreover, since the set of available actions can be framed in different ways 
and different frames of the same action set sometimes elicit different behaviors, 
neuroeconomics may also contribute to a deeper understanding of framing effects.  
This paper discusses recent neuroeconomic evidence related to other-regarding 
(nonselfish) behaviors and the decision to trust in other people’s nonselfish behavior. As we 
will show, this evidence supports the view that people derive nonpecuniary utility (i) from 
mutual cooperation in social dilemma (SD) games and (ii) from punishing unfair behavior in 
these games. Thus, mutual cooperation that takes place despite strong free riding incentives, 
and the punishment of free riders in SD games is not irrational, but better understood as 
rational behavior of people with corresponding social preferences. Finally, we report the 
results of a recent study that examines the impact of the neuropeptide Oxytocin (OT) on 
trusting and trustworthy behavior in a sequential SD. Animal studies have identified Oxytocin 
as a hormone that induces prosocial approach behavior, suggesting that it may also affect 
prosocial behavior in humans. Indeed, the study shows that subjects given Oxytocin exhibit 
much more trusting behavior, despite the fact that OT does not change their explicit beliefs 
about others’ behavior. Thus, it seems that OT has a direct impact on certain aspects of 
subjects’ social preferences. Interestingly, however, although Oxytocin affects trusting 
behavior, it has no effect on subjects’ trustworthiness.  
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At the general level, economic theory has been reluctant to assume anything specific 
about human preferences, except for the fact that they satisfy the axioms of revealed 
preference theory. In practice, however, economists often make the strong assumption that 
individual preferences are exclusively self-regarding. However, a large body of evidence 
(Colin F. Camerer, 2003, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, 2003) now suggests that a 
substantial share of the people exhibits social preferences and that an even larger share 
typically shows trust in the existence of these preferences. Sequential SD games that are 
played only once are a neat vehicle for demonstrating the behavioral relevance of social 
preferences. This game can be described as follows: there are two players, A and B, each of 
whom has an initial endowment of $10. First, player A decides whether to keep his 
endowment or to send it to player B. Then player B observes A’s action and decides whether 
to keep her endowment or to send it to A. The experimenter doubles each transfer payment, 
i.e., both players are better off if they transfer their endowments than if they both keep them. 
This situation mimics a sequential economic exchange in the absence of contract enforcement 
institutions. B has a strong incentive to keep her endowment regardless of whether A 
transferred or not; if A anticipates this behavior, however, he has little reason to transfer his 
endowment. A mutually beneficial exchange can only take place if A trusts B and if B 
behaves nonselfishly by transferring her endowment.  
Literally hundreds of experiments, with stake levels up to several months’ income, have 
confirmed that a large share of subjects in the role of player B reciprocates player A's trust 
and that an even larger share of subjects in the role of A trusts B (Camerer, 2003, Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003). Moreover, if we add a third decision stage to this game by giving player 
A the option of rewarding or punishing B at a cost to himself, many A players reward those B 
players who reciprocated their trust and punish those B players who did not do so (Fehr et al., 
1997). Why do we observe these strong deviations from the predictions of the standard 
model? What are the driving forces behind the decision to trust, to reciprocate trust, and to 
punish non-reciprocation? To what extent do emotional factors play a role here, and how do 
they interact with the human ability for rational deliberation? Can reciprocation and 
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punishment best be modeled by assuming that they are preferred behaviors, or are these 
behaviors just a reflection of subjects’  bounded rationality, as some authors have claimed 
(Larry Samuelson, forthcoming). In the following we will show that neuroeconomic studies 
can help answer these questions.  
 
I. Neural evidence for a taste for the punishment of unfair behavior 
In a recent paper, (Dominique DeQuervain et al., 2004) combined a two-player sequential SD 
game with Positron Emission Tomography (PET) imaging of subjects’ brains; PET is one 
method for measuring the activation of different brain areas. In this game, player A had the 
opportunity of punishing player B after observing whether B reciprocated A’s trust by 
assigning up to 20 punishment points to B. The monetary consequences of the punishment 
depended on the treatment conditions and will be explained below. Player A's brain was 
scanned with PET when A received information about B’s decision and during his decision 
about whether to punish B. The main purpose of this study was to examine what happens in 
A’s brain when B abuses his trust. The study was led by the hypothesis that player A has a 
taste for punishing B if B intentionally abuses his trust. Models of social preferences and 
reciprocity developed in the past 5-8 years suggest this hypothesis. If it is correct, we should 
observe the activation of reward-related brain areas during and after A’s decision to punish. 
This activation of reward-related areas could be due to the satisfaction a player anticipates if 
he decides to punish player B for unfair behavior.  
An important prerequisite for this study was the existence of neuroscientific knowledge 
about the key components of the brain’s reward circuits. Fortunately, many recent studies 
have shown that an area in the midbrain, the striatum, is a key part of reward-related neural 
circuits. Single neuron recording in non-human primates (Wolfram Schultz, 2000) and 
neuroimaging studies with humans using money as a reward medium (John P. O'Doherty, 
2004) indicate clearly that the striatum is a key part of reward-related neural circuits. 
Moreover, if A punishes B because he anticipates deriving satisfaction from punishing, one 
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should observe activation predominantly in those reward-related brain areas that are 
associated with goal-directed behavior. There is strong evidence from single neuron recording 
in non-human primates (Schultz, 2000) that the dorsal striatum is crucial for the integration of 
reward information and behavioral information in the sense of a goal-directed mechanism. 
Several recent neuroimaging studies support the view that the dorsal striatum is implicated in 
processing rewards resulting from a decision (O'Doherty, 2004). The fact that the dorsal 
striatum also responds to expected monetary gains in a parametric way is of particular interest 
from an economic viewpoint: if subjects successfully complete a task that generates monetary 
rewards, the activation in the dorsal striatum increases as the expected monetary gain grows. 
Thus, if A's dorsal striatum is activated when punishing B, we have a strong piece of evidence 
indicating that punishment is rewarding.  
To examine the activation of striatal areas during the decision to punish, subjects’ brains 
were mainly scanned in those SD trials in which B abused A’s trust.1 In the condition termed 
“costly” (C), the punishment was costly for both A and B. Every punishment point assigned to 
B cost experimental $1 for A and reduced B’s payoff by experimental $2. In the condition 
termed “free” (F), punishment was not costly for A. Every punishment point assigned to B 
cost nothing for A while B’s payoff was reduced by $2. In a third condition, which we call 
“symbolic” (S), punishment had only a symbolic (and no pecuniary) value. Every punishment 
point assigned to B cost neither A nor B anything. Thus, A could not reduce B's payoff in this 
condition.  
The hypothesis that punishment is rewarding predicts that the contrast F – S will show 
the activation of reward related brain areas after A’s trust has been abused2. The rationale 
behind this prediction is that A is likely to have a desire to punish B both in the F and the S 
                                                 
1 Player A played the game seven times with seven different subjects in the role of player B.  
2 Brain activations in neuroimaging are always measured in one condition relative to another 
condition. Thus, the F – S contrast provides information about those brain areas that are more 
highly activated in the F relative to the S condition.   
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condition because B intentionally abused A’s trust, but A cannot really hurt B in the S 
condition. Thus, the purely symbolic punishment in the S condition is unlikely to be 
satisfactory because the desire to punish the defector cannot be fulfilled effectively, and in the 
unlikely case that symbolic punishment is satisfactory, it is predicted to be less so than 
punishment in the F condition.  
The F – S contrast is ideal for examining the satisfying aspects of effective punishment 
because – except for the difference in the opportunity to punish effectively – everything else 
remains constant across conditions. However, punishment should also generate satisfaction 
from an economic viewpoint if it is costly. If there is indeed a taste for punishing defectors 
and if subjects actually do punish because the cost of punishing is not too high, the act of 
punishment is analogous to buying a good. Rational subjects buy the good as long as the 
marginal costs are below the marginal benefits. Thus, an economic model based on a taste for 
punishment predicts that punishment in the C condition should also be experienced as 
satisfactory, implying that reward related areas will also be activated in the C – S condition.  
Questionnaire and behavioral evidence indicates that player A indeed had a strong desire 
to punish the defectors. In fact, almost all subjects punished maximally in the F condition, 
while most subjects still punished in the C condition, albeit at a lower level. This reduction in 
the level of punishment makes sense because punishment was costly in the C condition. Most 
importantly, however, the dorsal striatum was strongly activated in both the F – S contrast and 
the C – S contrast, indicating that punishment is experienced as satisfactory. Moreover, the 
data show that those subjects in the C condition who exhibit higher activations in the dorsal 
striatum also punish more. This positive correlation can be interpreted in two ways: first, the 
higher level of punishment could cause the increased activation of the dorsal striatum, i.e., the 
higher satisfaction. Second, the greater anticipated satisfaction from punishing could cause the 
higher level of punishment, i.e., the activation in the striatum reflects – in this view – the 
anticipated satisfaction from punishing. It would be reassuring from an economic viewpoint if 
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the second interpretation were the correct one because it relies on the idea that the anticipated 
rewards from punishing drive the punishment decision.  
Both the popular press and neuroscience often claim that emotions are an overpowering 
force that inhibit rational behavior. Emotions like anger are known to play an important role 
in punishing defectors (Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, 2002). Thus, it is theoretically possible 
that anger overrides rationality and induces subjects to punish the defector “blindly”. 
However, if it could be shown that, while anger is important in these situations, subjects 
decide rationally about how much they want to punish a defector, one could argue in favor of 
an economic approach. According to this approach, emotions like anger have a motivational 
impact because they change the hedonic consequences of different actions; yet, given the 
hedonic consequences of different actions, subjects decide rationally by weighing the costs 
and benefits of the actions.  
DeQuervain et al. (2004) provide two pieces of evidence in favor of an economic 
approach. The first piece of evidence is related to the C – F contrast. Subjects face a nontrivial 
trade off in the C condition between the benefits and costs of punishing, whereas the decision 
is much simpler in the F condition because no costs exist. Thus, certain parts of the prefrontal 
cortex (Brodmann areas 10 and 11), which are known to be involved in integrating the 
benefits and costs for the purpose of decision-making, should be more strongly activated in 
the C condition than in the F condition. This is in fact the case. The second piece of evidence 
is based on the observation that most subjects punished maximally in the F condition. Thus, 
the differences in striatum activation across these subjects cannot be due to different levels of 
punishment. However, if different striatum activations reflect differences in the anticipated 
satisfaction from punishment, those subjects who exhibit higher striatum activations in the F 
condition (although they punish at the same maximal level) should be willing to spend more 
money on punishment in the C condition. The data again supports this prediction. 
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II. The Rewards of Mutual Cooperation 
Models of social preferences and reciprocity are based on the idea that a substantial share of 
people prefers mutual cooperation over unilateral defection in a SD. These models are based 
on behavioral evidence indicating that many second movers in a sequential SD reciprocate 
player A’s trust. However, skeptics (Samuelson, forthcoming) have argued that self-interest 
might also explain behavior that is seemingly consistent with social preferences, if subjects 
treat one-shot games as if they were repeated games involving the possibility for future 
punishment.  
Neuroeconomic evidence may be able to resolve this debate. One possibility is to show 
that mutual cooperation yields higher utility than unilateral defection. However, computing 
the brain contrast between mutual cooperation and unilateral defection is not ideal because 
any difference in brain activation could be due the fact that the scanned player cooperates in 
one situation and defects in the other. The measured activations might have nothing to do with 
the special hedonic consequences of the mutual cooperation outcome but might be caused by 
the behavioral difference. There is, however, another way to solve this problem. One of the 
first neuroeconomic studies (James K Rilling et al., 2002) reports activations in the striatum 
when subjects experience mutual cooperation with a human partner compared to mutual 
cooperation with a computer partner. Thus, despite the fact that the subject's monetary gain is 
identical in both situations, mutual cooperation with a human partner seems to be experienced 
as a more rewarding outcome, indicating that extra benefits from mutual cooperation extend 
beyond the mere monetary gain. Unfortunately, however, the Rilling et al. study is based on a 
repeated SD. A repeated dilemma game involves a host of other confounding influences 
which might shed doubt on the interpretation of brain activations in terms of social 
preferences. A recent paper based on a one-shot sequential SD has solved this problem 
(Rilling et al., 2004). The authors show again that the mutual cooperation outcome with a 
human partner generates higher striatum activation than the mutual cooperation outcome with 
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a computer partner.3 Moreover, the mutual cooperation outcome with a human partner also 
generates higher activations than does earning the same amount of money in a trivial 
individual decision-making task. A further study showing that the mere viewing of faces of 
people who previously cooperated in a SD activates reward related areas (Tania Singer et al., 
2004) indicates the special hedonic qualities of mutual cooperation. This result suggests that 
people derive more utility from interactions with cooperative people not just because they can 
earn more money in these interactions but because these interactions are rewarding per se.  
 
III. The Neurobiology of Trust 
Neuroeconomics is not restricted to the use of imaging techniques. A recent study (Michael 
Kosfeld et al., 2005) examined the neurobiological basis of trusting and trustworthy behavior 
in a sequential SD. Animal studies on the neurobiology of certain forms of prosocial behavior 
(Thomas R. Insel and Larry J. Young, 2001) suggest the hypothesis that the neuropeptide 
Oxytocin (OT) might provide a biological basis for trusting behavior in humans. OT 
facilitates maternal behavior and pair bonding in different species. Specifically, OT seems 
both to permit animals to overcome their natural avoidance of proximity and to inhibit 
defensive behavior, thereby facilitating approach and biparental care.  
Kosfeld et al. examined the hypothesis that OT facilitates trust and trustworthiness by 
comparing behavior in an SD in a group of subjects that received OT with that of subjects in a 
control group that received placebo. Their results indeed show that subjects with OT exhibit 
significantly more trusting behavior; however, OT does not affect player B's trustworthiness. 
More specifically, the percentage of players A who trusts maximally in a SD increases from 
                                                 
3 In the Rilling et al studies the ventral and not the dorsal striatum is activated. This makes 
sense because the brain contrasts were measured after subjects who cooperated were informed 
whether their (computer or human) opponent also cooperated. Thus, the contrast measures the 
experienced and not the anticipated extra benefits of mutual cooperation with a human 
partner.  
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21% to 45% whereas the transfers of player B remain constant between the OT and the 
placebo group. Kosfeld et al. also measure how OT affects subjects’ calmness, wakefulness, 
and mood, to control for the possibility that such side effects are responsible for the effect of 
OT on trusting behavior. However, a sizeable and significant effect of OT on trust remains, 
even after controlling for these indirect effects. The direct effect of OT increases the 
probability of trusting maximally by 20 percentage points.  
An interesting question is whether OT operates at the level of subjects’ beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness or whether it operates at the level of subjects’ preferences. Recent 
research (Iris Bohnet and Richard Zeckhauser, 2004) shows that the decision to trust is not 
shaped by risk aversion, but by exploitation aversion, i.e. by the fear of being fooled by player 
B. Thus, in the same way OT overcomes the animals’ natural tendency to avoid others, OT 
might also overcome the “natural” fear of being exploited by others in a SD. The results of the 
Kosfeld et al study show that OT does not affect subjects’ beliefs about player B’s 
trustworthiness. Although subjects with OT and the placebo hold the same beliefs, subjects 
with OT make themselves more vulnerable to exploitation by sending more money to B. 
Thus, it seems that subjects with OT are more willing to take the risk of being exploited, 
suggesting that OT affects subjects’ exploitation aversion. This effect is insofar interesting as 
economists usually assume that preferences are stable. However, if preferences are based on 
actual or anticipated emotions, they may be much less stable than typically assumed because 
emotions are often transient. Moreover, as the OT study suggests, preferences and the 
underlying affective states can be deliberately shaped over short periods of time by 
administering the “right” substance.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
We have discussed recent neuroeconomic evidence on social preferences and trust in 
this paper. However, the implications of neuroeconomic studies go far beyond these areas of 
research (Camerer et al., 2005). Neuroeconomic studies are likely to provide insights into how 
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the human reward system is linked to decision making in intertemporal choice (Samuel M. 
McClure et al., 2004) and risk (Hans C. Breiter et al., 2001) and how affect and cognition 
interact to generate decisions (Alan G. Sanfey et al., 2003). Such studies enable us to go 
beyond the prevailing “as if” approach in economics by uncovering the neural mechanisms 
behind individual decisions. In the long term, it may well be that neuroeconomic insights 
fundamentally change the current preferences and beliefs approach that prevails in economics. 
For example, economics assumes that an individual’s beliefs about the other player’s actions 
do not depend on the individual’s preferences. This assumption precludes motivated belief 
formation, making it difficult to understand questions of religious beliefs, ideology, 
aggression towards outgroup members, the structure and the content of political and economic 
advertising campaigns that appeal to people’s emotions, etc. Perhaps, however, there are 
neural and affective mechanisms which allow preferences to influence beliefs and vice versa. 
Reputation formation may provide an example: if we are cheated in a social exchange, we 
have a strong affective reaction that shapes our preferences towards the opponent (Singer et 
al., 2004 study). This affective reaction may also shape our beliefs about the opponent’s 
future behaviors. We would be surprised if such affect guided belief formation obeyed the 
rules of Bayesian updating.   
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